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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
data to verify his position. In addressing itself to this testimony the Court
stated that "there must be some evidence of a basis for the opinion, and the
acceptance in one case of 'possible' as meaning reasonable medical certainty
does not justify treating every possibility as though it were enough to establish
the facts sought to be proved."73 The Court pointed out that to accept such. a
standard would overturn the rule established in Stubbs v. City of Rochesth -e
that the burden to prove causation is on the party asserting that a disease is
based on actionable facts. The Court did not say that the mere use of such
words as "could produce" or "it is possible" in and of themselves destroy proba-
tive force of testimony. However, the opinion evidence was not found "fortified
by detailed explanation and other facts in the record which add to its reason-
ableness and correctness."75
It is established that a finding is supported by the evidence only when
the evidence is so substantial that from it an inference of the existence of the
fact may be reasonably found.76 Mere proof of possibility, or even a pre-
ponderance of possibilities or a majority of chance, never can suffice alone to
establish a proposition of fact.77 It is only when there is no substantial K i-
dence of a competent, probative force to sustain an administrative conclusion,
that a court is warranted in setting aside the determination. 78
TEST USED, EVEN THOUGH NOT THAT PRESCRIBED By REGULATION, ADMIS-
SIBLE IN EVIDENCE TO SHOW GUILT
The defendant in the case of People v. Prince Jagendorff Greene Inc.
was charged with violating the Rules and Regulations of the Department of Air
Pollution Control adopted pursuant to Chapter 47 of the Administrative Code
of the City of New York. The rules prohibited the sale or transportation of
any solid fuel with a volatile content in excess of 24% on an ash-and-moisture-
free basis for hand-firing equipment.80
Volatile matter was defined by the Department as "The gaseous con-
stituent of fuels as determined by standards of the American Society for
Testing Materials"."' The American Society for Testing Materials procedure
under this standard of testing provided for the taking of a gross sample of not
less than 90 pounds, consisting of a minimum of nine increments, each in-
crement weighing not less than 10 pounds s.8 2
73. Supra note 71 at 284, 204 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1960Y.
74. 226 N.Y. 516, 124 N.E. 137 (1919).
75. Zaepfel v. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 284 App. Div. 693, 696, 134 N.Y.S.2d
377, 380 (3d Dep't 1954).
76. Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d 581 (1954).
77. Erin Wine and Liquor Store v. O'Connell, 307 N.Y. 768, 112 N.E.2d 612 (1954).
78. Reynolds v. Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, 276 App. Div. 3S9, 94
N.Y.S.2d 841 (1st Dep't 1950).
79. 7 N.Y.2d 42, 194 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1959).
80. Rules of Department of Air Polution Control, 14.3, 14.3.2, 14.4.
81. Rules and Regulations of the Department of Air Pollution Control, § 0.
82. American Society for Testing Material, designation D 980-53.
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The Magistrates' Court found defendant guilty of such violation in that
he sold bituminous coal having a volatile content of 31.44%. The evidence in-
troduced showed that at least four increments of coal weighing between 8 to
15 pounds were taken from different parts of the batch in the truck. These in
turn were pulverized and samples of 2 to 3 pounds were taken and placed in
two wax containers. One container was given to the driver for the coal com-
pany and the other was delivered to the city's laboratory. The chemist for
the city testified that when the sample was tested, it contained 31.44% volatile
matter on an ash-and-moisture-free basis. The defendant rested without calling
witnesses or offering proof to controvert the evidence submitted by the People.
Instead, defendant made a motion to dismiss on the sole ground that the city
had failed to follow the procedures for testing of the American Society for
Testing Materials which was denied. On appeal, the Court of Special Sessions
reversed the judgment holding that the sample of coal taken by the inspector
for analysis by the city's chemist was, according to a specific standard which
was allegedly prescribed by the department, too small to be representative of
the bulk of the coal sold. The Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Special
Sessions and ordered a new trial stating that the prosecution's showing that the
coal sold by the defendant contained excessive volatile content made a prima
facie case of violation of the regulation, even though the sample was not taken
in accordance with the procedures of the American Society for Testing Ma-
terials, since there was no showing by the defendant that the procedure fol-
lowed was inaccurate.83
The defendant's argument is predicated on the contention that the De-
partment adopted a specified standard of testing when it included in its rules
a definition of "Volatile matter" as "The gaseous constituent of fuels as
determined by standards of the American Society of Testing Materials." De-
fendant argues that the Department was bound, under its rules, to use this
standard to the exclusion of all other recognized accurate standards.
However, the use of the definition shows only an intent to adopt a standard
of analysis, not a binding obligation to do so. The Department is not limited
to the standards mentioned, but may introduce evidence of any tests shown
to be accurate.8 4 This is not a situation where the applicable statute or regu-
lation specifically prescribes the analyzing process to be used. In these circum-
stances, courts have accepted evidence or reports of methods of testing made by
recognized processes. 85 It is up to the defendant to show that such tests used
are inaccurate.
83. Supra note 79.
84. See United States v. 100 Barrels of Vinegar, 188 F. 471 (D.C. Minn. 1911).
85. People v. Rickard, 48 App. Div. 408, 63 N.Y. Supp. 165 (3d Dep't 1900).
